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When attorney effort is unobservable and certain other simplifying assumptions
(such as risk neutrality) hold, it is efﬁcient for an attorney to purchase the rights to
a client’s legal claim. However, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct prohibit this arrangement. We show that this ethical restriction,
which is formally equivalent to requiring a minimum ﬁxed fee of zero, can create
economic rents for attorneys, even though they continue to compete along the con-
tingent-fee dimension. The contingent fee is not bid down to the zero-proﬁt level,
because such a fee does not induce sufﬁcient attorney effort. We thereby provide a
political economy explanation for these restrictions.
I. Introduction
When attorney effort is unobservable and certain other simplifying as-
sumptions (such as risk neutrality) hold, it is well known that competition
among attorneys handling personal injury lawsuits produces a fee structure
that is efﬁcient and that yields zero economic proﬁts. Speciﬁcally, the client
pays a 100 percent contingent fee and a negative ﬁxed fee equal to the
expected value of the recovery net of litigation costs. In effect, the attorney
buys the rights to the client’s legal claim. The attorney then fully internalizes
the consequences of choosing less effort, which eliminates moral hazard
problems and yields an efﬁcient outcome.
This fee arrangement, however, is prohibited in most states by ethical
restrictions based on the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. As discussed in detail below, the rules prohibit attor-
neys from providing ﬁnancial assistance to a client in connection with a
* We are grateful to Donald Bruce, John V. Duca, Dino Falaschetti, Evan Koenig, David
Robison, Kathryn Spier, Lori L. Taylor, V. Brian Viard, Tulane University Economics De-
partment seminar participants, American Law and Economics Association participants, and
discussants at the Western Economic Association for helpful comments. We are solely re-
sponsible for any errors. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do
not reﬂect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.550 the journal of law and economics
pending or contemplated lawsuit. These rules effectively seta minimumvalue
of zero for the ﬁxed fee, precluding the purchase of legal claims.
Various explanations have been given for these fee restrictions. One view,
supported by Marc Shukaitis,
1 is that the restrictions are historical relics that
are unnecessary and inefﬁcient in the modern legal environment. Other au-
thors have argued informally that the restrictions play an anticompetitive
role.
2 However, given that attorneys remain free to compete along the
contingent-fee dimension, it is not obvious that competition is harmed by
the nonnegativity constraint on ﬁxed fees. Despite the lack of formal justi-
ﬁcation, numerous courts and state bar associations have acknowledged the
anticompetitive purpose of the restrictions.
3
We provide a political economy explanation for the restrictions, arguing
that they beneﬁt attorneys while harming clients. In particular, we show
that the restrictions on negative ﬁxed fees, like other forms of price-ﬁxing,
can function as anticompetitive devices. When the ﬁxed costs of litigation
are low, these restrictions allow attorneys to earn economic rents on law-
suits, even though attorneys remain free to compete with respect to the
contingent fee.
Our argument relies on the moral hazard problem inherent in the attorney-
client relationship. When attorney effort is not veriﬁable, contingent fees
serve a dual role: in addition to compensating the attorney, contingent fees
also provide the incentive for the attorney to put forth effort. Since attorneys
put forth less effort at lower contingent fees, clients may prefer a higher
contingent fee to the one that yields zero proﬁts. Therefore, when the ﬁxed
fee is restricted, an otherwise competitive market need not offer the contin-
gent fee that yields zero proﬁts. Instead, the contingent fee exhibitsdownward
rigidity at the value that maximizes the client’s surplus, even if attorneys
would accept a lower fee. Clients are unwilling to hire an attorney who offers
a lowercontingentfee, because doing sowouldreducetheirnetrecovery—the
lower level of attorney effort induced by the lower contingent fee would
reduce the recovery by enough to outweigh the client’s larger share of the
recovery. As a result, attorneys cannot undercut this equilibrium by offering
a lower contingent fee.
The positive rents created by these restrictions may not constitute pure
proﬁts, once the costs of entry into the legal profession are taken into account.
To address this point, we allow for the possibility that entry is costly but
otherwise unrestricted. Attorneys then enter until the rents exactly offset the
1 Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. Legal Stud. 329, 331
(1987).
2 Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 Cal. L. Rev. 48, 66 (1935);CharlesW.Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics 507 (1986); and Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a Law . . . What
Might Happen If Contingent Legal Fees Were Banned, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 321, 325–28 (1998).
For further discussion, see Section IIB infra.
3 For further discussion, see Section IIB infra.legal fee restrictions 551
costs of entry, yielding zero economic proﬁts. Nevertheless, eliminating the
restrictions after the entry costs are sunk would impose ex post losses on
incumbent attorneys, who could no longer recover their costs through rents.
Maintenance of the restrictions is therefore in the incumbents’ interest, even
if attorneys do not earn positive economic proﬁts.
Our story is similar to the efﬁciency wage theory, which postulates that
employers may ﬁnd it optimal to pay wages in excess of employees’ res-
ervation wages when monitoring is either costly or imperfect.
4 However,
according to that theory, agents who are not monitored always put forth the
minimum level of effort. In our model, the agent chooses a positive level of
effort even though there is no monitoring because the contingent fee makes
the attorney’s reward dependent on the outcome. Similarly, agents in the
efﬁciency-wage model would choose positive effort, regardless of the level
of monitoring, if their compensation were contingent on the outcome.
On a formal level, our paper is most closely related to those papers that
view contingent fees as a means of alleviating moral hazard. Bruce Hay
characterizes optimal contingent fees when the ﬁxed fee is constrained to
equal zero.
5 In a later work, Hay uses a model that allows for out-of-court
settlements in addition to moral hazard to show that the client can generally
beneﬁt by paying a relatively large contingent fee if the lawsuit goes to court
and a relatively small fee if it is settled out of court.
6 M. L. Schwartz and
D. J. B. Mitchell focus on whether contingent fees encourage excess litigation
and the related question of whether fee caps would lead to less litigation.
7
James Dana and Kathryn Spier analyze the case in which the attorney is
better informed about the merits of the lawsuit than the client, so that there
is moral hazard with regard to legal advice.
8 Patricia Danzon considers the
case in which effort is effectively observable.
9
II. Ethical Constraints on Fixed Fees
A. Development of Rules
The ethical restrictions imposed on attorneys are related to the general
prohibitions on the purchase and sale of personal injury claims and to the
4 See, for example, Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a
Worker Discipline Device, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 433 (1984).
5 Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. Legal Stud. 503 (1996).
6 Bruce L. Hay, Optimal Contingent Fees in a World of Settlement, 26 J. Legal Stud. 259
(1997).
7 M. L. Schwartz & D. J. B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingency Fee and
Personal Injury Litigation, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1125 (1970).
8 James D. Dana, Jr., & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of
Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation, 9 J. L. Econ. & Org. 349 (1993).
9 Patricia Munch Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation, 14 Bell J. Econ.
213 (1983).552 the journal of law and economics
English common law’s prohibition against champerty.
10 Champerty is deﬁned
as the ﬁnancing of a lawsuit by someone other than the plaintiff who is to
be paid from the proceeds of the lawsuit. The rule against champerty can be
traced back to the Greeks and Romans.
11 However, the prohibition has been
abandoned or deemphasized in many of the American states during the last
century.
12 In some cases, nonattorney investors now purchase personal injury
claims from plaintiffs.
13
Nevertheless, each state continues to impose ethical restrictionsonattorney
payments to clients, generally based on standards set by the ABA.
14 The
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908, stated that “the lawyer
should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which
he is conducting.”
15 The Canons further underscored this prohibition on
ﬁnancial assistance to clients by stating that “a lawyer may not...p a y o r
bear the expenses of litigation; he may in good faith advance expenses as a
matter of convenience, but subject to reimbursement.”
16 Since this rule re-
quired client reimbursement of litigation expenses even if the lawsuit was
lost, the minimum ﬁxed fee (payment by an unsuccessful client) was not
only nonnegative, but positive and equal to litigation expenses. Also, since
the only permissible loan mentioned was the advancement of litigation ex-
penses, most states held that lawyers could not make other loans to clients,
even if losing clients were required to repay them.
17
When the ABA replaced the Canons with the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1970, the restrictions were little changed. The Model Code
prohibited a lawyer from acquiring a proprietary interest in the subject matter
of litigation but added that a reasonable contingent fee was permitted.
18 It
also stated that “a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee ﬁnancial assistance
to a client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of
litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of med-
ical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided
the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.”
19
10 See Shukaitis, supra note 1, at 330.
11 See Radin, supra note 2, at 48–57.
12 See id. at 68; and Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The
Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 231, 235–42
(1998).
13 See Richard B. Schmitt, Staking Claims: A Las Vegas Lender Tests Odds in Court—and
Forms an Industry, Wall St. J., September 15, 2000, at A1, col. 6.
14 The history of the ABA rules is described by American Bar Association, ABA Compen-
dium of Professional Rules and Standards 7–11 (1997), and Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon,
Jr., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards, at xvii (1996).
15 Canon of Professional Ethics 10 (1956).
16 Id. at 42.
17 See Wolfram, supra note 2, at 507–8 (citing cases and bar association opinions).
18 Model Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 5-103(A) (1983).
19 Id. at 5-103(B).legal fee restrictions 553
However, many attorneys who advanced litigation expenses did not ac-
tually collect these expenses from unsuccessful clients.
20 In practice, the
minimum ﬁxed fee under both the Canons and the Model Code was zero
rather than positive.
The ABA replaced the Model Code with the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in 1983. Model Rule 1.8(j) continues the prohibition on a proprietary
interest other than a reasonable contingent fee.
21 In a change, however, Model
Rule 1.8(e) states that “a lawyer shall not provide ﬁnancial assistance to a
client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that a
lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment
of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.”
22 This rule
recognizes that losing clients are unlikely to pay litigation expenses and
merely requires that the ﬁxed fee paid by a losing client be equal to or greater
than zero.
Some state rules deviate to some extent from the ABA Model Rules. The
Appendix describes the ethical restrictions in the 50 states and the District
of Columbia. Two jurisdictions allow negative ﬁxed fees to some extent. The
District of Columbia permits attorneys to provide “ﬁnancial assistance which
is reasonably necessary to allow the client to institute or maintain the liti-
gation.”
23 Texas allows attorneys to loan “reasonably necessary medical and
living expenses,” with repayment contingent on the outcome of the litiga-
tion.
24 Since the allowable payments are limited to the stated category of
expenses, however, the minimum ﬁxed fee is still zero for lawsuits in which
these types of expenses are not incurred.
Four states explicitly allow an attorney to lend “emergency ﬁnancial as-
sistance” to a client.
25 In addition, California allows loans to clients for any
purpose.
26 (As discussed in Section IIB below, these states impose some
interesting restrictions on the manner in which attorneys can provide such
loans.) In some other states, courts have permitted loans of living and medical
expenses, although the Rules appear to prohibit them. Since losing clients
remain ultimately liable for repayment of these loans, the minimum ﬁxed
20 See Dana & Spier, supra note 8, at 353 n.14; Robert H. Aronson & Donald T. Weckstein,
Professional Responsibility in a Nutshell 276 (1991); Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan,
Improving the Contingent Fee, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 529, 532 n.3 (1978); and Shukaitis, supra
note 1, at 339 n.52.
21 Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(j) (2000).
22 Id. at 1.8(e).
23 District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(d)(2) (2000).
24 Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.08(d)(1) (2001).
25 Alabama Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(e)(3) (2000); Minnesota Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.8(e)(3) (1999); Montana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(e)(3) (1999); and North
Dakota Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(e)(3) (2000).
26 Rule of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California 4-210(A)(2) (2000).554 the journal of law and economics
fee is still formally zero. However, the actual ﬁxed fee is negative if losing
clients do not repay these loans.
The Appendix lists 13 states that depart from the Model Rules in the
opposite direction. Seven statescontinue to formallyrequirethatlosingclients
repay litigation expenses (as the Canons and Model Code had required)unless
they are indigent or unable to repay, and six other states formally require
such repayment by all losing clients, even those who are indigent. However,
these restrictions remain largely unenforced.
B. Anticompetitive Purpose
A variety of arguments have been advanced to explain the ethical restric-
tions. Radin notes that the rise ofthebaninancientGreeceandRomereﬂected
the belief that litigants should prepare and deliver their own arguments and
should be accompanied to the trial by only their relatives and friends. The
legal system did not accept ﬁnancial arrangements that led to “interference”
by outsiders with no personal interest in the litigation. Radin notes that this
rationale became less relevant after the professional attorney came into
existence.
27
Shukaitis identiﬁes four arguments commonly made against a market in
personal injury tort claims: spurious claims would become more frequent,
the volume of litigation would increase, the right to recover from personal
injury is inherently inalienable, and claims buyers would take advantage of
uninformed tort victims. However, he states that “today one must question
whether any reason remains for prohibiting assignments to avoid mainte-
nance” and ultimately concludes “that a market in personal injury tort claims
would provide substantial beneﬁts that would more than outweigh the
costs.”
28
Heuristic evidence suggests that the restrictions have survived, at least in
part, because they restrict competition. Max Radin noted that, at the time of
his writing, the ban on champerty tended to prevent agreements between
plaintiffs and less established attorneys and stated that “in most instances,
the modern objections to champerty are voiced by the more successful mem-
bers of the profession and on behalf of propertied defendants.”
29 PeterKarsten
similarly notes that defendants (railroads and physicians) and their attorneys
opposed the relaxation of the champerty prohibition in the late nineteenth
century.
30 A leading legal treatise comments that contemporary rules against
attorney ﬁnancial assistance to clients “are also transparently concerned with
the risk that the promise of money advances would be employed by some
27 Radin, supra note 2, at 65–69.
28 Shukaitis, supra note 1, at 330.
29 Radin, supra note 2, at 66.
30 Karsten, supra note 12, at 254.legal fee restrictions 555
lawyers to solicit clients.”
31 Samuel Gross concludes that a market in tort
claims would be likely to beneﬁt plaintiffs but that potential losses to plain-
tiffs’ attorneys and to defendants probably explain opposition to such a
market.
32
Courts and bar associations have sometimes stated candidly that the ethical
restrictions are intended to suppress price competition among attorneys. The
Maryland Court of Appeals justiﬁed the restrictions by stating, “An important
public policy interest is to avoid unfair competition among lawyers on the
basis of their expenditures to clients. Clients should not be inﬂuenced to seek
representation based on the ease with which monies can be obtained.”
33 The
Arizona Supreme Court commented that “the practice of making advances
to clients, if publicized, would constitute an improper inducement for clients
to employ an attorney....[ B ] e t ween a lawyer who offers such an agree-
ment and a lawyer who does not, the client will choose the lawyer who
offers the lesser ﬁnancial obligation.”
34 The Kentucky Bar Association re-
cently reafﬁrmed the state’s ban on advances for living and medical expenses
after noting that “dropping the time-honored rule will invite bidding by
lawyers for clients.”
35 When the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
modiﬁed its rules in 1990 to allow attorneys to provide ﬁnancial assistance
that a client needs to maintain the litigation (a rule more permissive than
any other jurisdiction except Texas), it still cautioned that the “provision does
not permit lawyers to ‘bid’ for clients by offering ﬁnancial payments beyond
those minimum payments necessary to sustain the client.”
36
In a particularly revealing development, several states have tolerated some
ﬁnancial assistance to clients (particularly loans) under conditions that ensure
that they will not place competitive pressures on other attorneys. The ﬁve
states that allow attorneys to loan emergency ﬁnancial assistance to clients
require that “no promise or assurance of ﬁnancial assistance [be] made to
t h ec l i e n t...p r i o rt ot h eemployment of the lawyer”
37 or that loans be
made only “after employment.”
38
The Lousiana Supreme Court allowed attorneys to loan reasonably nec-
essary living expenses to clients only if “the advances were not promised as
31 Wolfram, supra note 2, at 507.
32 Gross, supra note 2, at 325–28.
33 Attorney Grievance Committee v. Kandel, 563 A.2d 387, 390 (Md. 1989).
34 In re Carroll, 602 P.2d 461, 467 (Ariz. 1979).
35 Kentucky Bar Association Op. E-375 (1995).
36 District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8 cmt. (1990).
37 Alabama Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(e)(3) (2000); Minnesota Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.8(e)(3) (1999); Montana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(e)(3) (1999); and North
Dakota Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(e)(3) (2000).
38 Rule of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California 4-210(A)(2) (2000). Also see
Wolfram, supra note 2, at 509 n.89 (stating that California courts have interpreted the rule as
forbidding attorneys to discuss the availability of loans before representation begins).556 the journal of law and economics
an inducement to obtain professional employment, nor made until after the
employment relationship was commenced . . . and the attorney did not en-
courage public knowledge of this practice as an inducement to secure rep-
resentation of others.”
39 The Missouri Supreme Court, in allowing an attorney
to make a small loan to a destitute client, warned, “[O]f course, the loan
should not be the consideration for the employment.”
40,41
The above-mentioned rules are not the only fee restrictions that the legal
profession has imposed. Each state’s bar association adopted schedules of
minimum ﬁxed fees for a wide variety of legal services until 1975, when
such schedules were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as a form of
price-ﬁxing.
42 These schedules had an explicitly anticompetitive rationale.
43
However, the rules prohibiting the purchase of legal claims have apparently
escaped antitrust challenges, even though they also prescribe a minimum fee.
We now examine the impact of such restrictions on the welfare of attorneys
and clients.
III. The Basic Model
A risk-neutral client requires an attorney’s services to recover damages.
All attorneys are risk neutral, and the market for legal services is competitive,
with the exception of the moral hazard problem discussed below.
Following previous authors,
44 we allow for the possibility that lawsuits
require ﬁxed costs, such as legal ﬁling fees and initial investigation. We
assume that ﬁxed costs have a nonnegative dollar value M. Letting E denote
the dollar value of the attorney’s effort (in addition to the ﬁxed costs), total
litigation costs equal . M  E
Let denote the expected award (gross of legal fees), as a function A(E)
of effort. We make the standard assumptions that the function is increasing
and strictly concave, . For convenience, we also assume
     A(7) 1 0, A (7) ! 0
that a positive award can be obtained only with positive attorney effort,
39 Louisiana State Bar Assocation v. Edwins, 329 So.2d 437, 446 (La. 1976).
40 In re Sizer, 267 S.W. 922, 924 (Mo. 1924).
41 Also see In re Berlant, 328 A.2d 471, 479 (Pa. 1974) (Manderino, J., concurring and
dissenting) (disciplinary action against an attorney who advanced living expenses was appro-
priate only because the advance was designed to inﬂuence the client to retain the attorney).
42 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (invalidating Fairfax County Bar
Association minimum-fee schedule under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1) (unanimous
decision).
43 The bar association permitted an attorney to charge a lower fee to a deserving client but
threatened disciplinary action against any attorney who, “purely for his own advancement,
intentionally and regularly bills less ...t oi n c r ease his business with resulting personal
g a i n...[ and] to encroach upon the employment of another.” Quoted in Goldfarb, supra
note 42, at 777 n.4.
44 See, for example, Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 7, at 1128; and P. J. Halpern & S. M.
Turnbull, Legal Fees Contracts and Alternative Cost Rules: An Economic Analysis, 3 Int’l
Rev. L. & Econ. 3, 13 (1983).legal fee restrictions 557
. In view of the risk-neutrality assumption, we refer to A as the A(0) p 0
“award” rather than the “expected award” without loss of generality.
We assume that the client and the attorney both know the function A(E)
but that the client cannot observe the attorney’s effort E.L e tF denote the
ﬁxed fee (the fee paid to the attorney by a client for whom no damages
are awarded) and f denote the contingent fee (the fraction of the award
received by the attorney). For each individual lawsuit, the attorney receives
. The fee is a linear function of the award.
45 fA(E)  F
The attorney’s proﬁts are . The client’s surplus p { fA(E)  F  E  M
(award net of legal fees) is . The combined value of S { (1  f)A(E)  F
the lawsuit to the attorney and client is the award minus the effort and ﬁxed
costs, . V { S  p p A(E)  E  M
We begin by ﬁnding the effort level that maximizes the combined value
of the lawsuit. (Of course, this is generally not the social optimum, since the
lawsuit also affects the defendant and the court system and has incentive
effects on other potential plaintiffs and defendants.) The maximum combined
value is . We conﬁne our attention to lawsuits
0 V { max A(E)  E  M 1 E 0
for which , since other lawsuits will not be ﬁled regardless of whether
0 V 1 0
the fee structure is restricted.
The effort level that maximizes , denoted , is implicitly
0 A(E)  E  ME
deﬁned as the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition
  0 A(E ) p 1. (1)
Note that this effort level does not depend on the ﬁxed costs.
With unobservable attorney effort, this is a classic moral hazard problem.
For any given fee structure, an attorney (conditional on taking the lawsuit)
chooses effort to maximize , which yields the
∗ E p { fA(E)  F  E  M
ﬁrst-order condition
 ∗ fA(E ) p 1. (2)
The combined value of the lawsuit is then .
∗∗ V(f) { A(E (f))  E (f)  M
Note that the attorney’s effort and the combined value do not depend on F.
So long as the lawsuit is ﬁled, the ﬁxed fee affects only the division of the
combined value between the client and attorney.
For simplicity, we assume , which implies that the at-
  lim A(E) p   Er0
torney’s effort (conditional on taking the lawsuit) is strictly positive for all
contingent fees, for all . Differentiating (2) reveals that at-
∗ E (f) 1 0 f 1 0
torney effort is an increasing function of the contingent fee,
45 We show in the next section that this linear structure is efﬁcient in the unconstrained case.
However, the linearity assumption is restrictive in the constrained case, a point to which we
return in Section VI infra.558 the journal of law and economics
∗  ∗ dE A(E ) 1
pp 1 0. (3)    ∗ 2    df fA (E ) fA
Attorney effort is more sensitive to the contingent fee if the award function
is ﬂatter ( has small absolute value). When the award function is relatively
   A
ﬂat, large changes in effort are required to achieve any given change in the
marginal product of effort (or to respond to any given changeinthecontingent
fee). Moral hazard is then more severe.
The combined value is an increasing function of the contingent fee at all
: f ! 1
∗ dV dE f  1
  p (A  1) p .( 4 ) 3    df df f A
The sign of is positive for . Therefore, as long as the attorney’s dV/df f ! 1
participation constraint is met, the combined value is maximized at , f p 1
when the attorney ﬁrst-order condition (2) is identical to (1).
If fees are unconstrained, competition achieves this outcome. The equi-
librium fee structure maximizes the client’s surplus, subject to the restriction
that attorney proﬁts are nonnegative. Since effort is not observable, the fee
structure recognizes that the attorney responds with effort level . There-
∗ E (f)
fore, the competitive equilibrium solves
∗ maxS { (1  f)A(E )  F
f,F
∗∗ subject to p { fA(E )  F  E  M ≥ 0,
where the argument of has been suppressed.
∗ E (f)
The solution to this problem includes a 100 percent contingent fee, which
maximizes the combined value of the lawsuit by inducing the efﬁcient level
of effort. The ﬁxed fee, which does not affect attorney effort, is set at the
lowest (most negative) value that keeps proﬁts nonnegative, so the client
receives a ﬁxed payment of from the attorney and extracts the entire
0 V
combined value.
Proposition 1. When the fee structure is not restricted, the equilibrium
fee structure induces the efﬁcient effort level and attorneys earn zero eco-
nomic proﬁts. The client “sells” the lawsuit to the attorney for a price equal
to its maximum combined value.
46
The moral hazard problem is alleviated in the unconstrained equilibrium.
However, this outcome is precluded by the ﬁxed-fee restrictions discussed
above.
46 We do not prove this result because it is relatively intuitive and has been observed by
previous authors. See, for example, Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal
and Agent Relationship, 55 Bell J. Econ. 55, 56 (1979); and Hay, supra note 5, at 504.legal fee restrictions 559
IV. Economic Effects of Minimum-Fixed-Fee Restrictions
We now consider the effects of a general constraint on minimum ﬁxed
fees, , where the Model Rules require a minimum ﬁxed fee of zero. F ≥ K
We conﬁne our attention to the case when , which implies that the
0 K 1 V
constraint is binding. As before, the equilibrium fee structure maximizes the
client’s surplus, subject to the attorney participation constraint and now the
minimum-ﬁxed-fee constraint,
∗ maxS { (1  f)A(E )  K
f
∗∗ subject to p { fA(E )  K  E  M ≥ 0.
The equilibrium contingent fee depends on how changes in the contingent
fee (holding the ﬁxed fee constant at K) affect the client surplus and the
attorney participation constraint.
Let denote the contingent fee that yields zero attorney proﬁts when f (K) Z
the ﬁxed fee is constrained to equal K. This zero-proﬁt fee is implicitly
deﬁned by
∗∗ M  fA (E (f ))  E (f ) p K.( 5 ) ZZ Z
Implicit differentiation of (5) yields , which reveals that f /K p 1/A ! 0 Z
the zero-proﬁt fee is a decreasing function of K. In other words, if the
minimum ﬁxed fee is higher (possibly less negative), the attorney can break
even with a smaller share of the award. One might expect that, for any given
K, competition drives the contingent fee down to this zero-proﬁt fee. We
now demonstrate that this need not occur and that attorneys can earn positive
proﬁts.
A higher contingent fee reduces the client’s share of the award, but it also
increases the award by inducing greater attorney effort. Therefore, theclient’s
preferred contingent fee is not always the lowest contingent fee that the
attorney is willing to accept. Assuming that the attorney takes the lawsuit,
the client’s surplus is maximized by acontingent S(f) p (1  f)A(E(f))  K
fee, denoted by , that satisﬁes the following ﬁrst-order condition, ˆ f
∗ dE
 ∗ ∗ ˆˆ ˆ (1  f)A(E (f)) p A(E (f)). (6)
df
For a small increase in the contingent fee, the left-hand side of (6) is the
increase in the client’s surplus that results from the additional attorney effort,
while the right-hand side is the loss in the client’s share of the award. It is560 the journal of law and economics
easy to show that this surplus-maximizing fee is strictly positive and inde-
pendent of K.
47
Equation (6) may have multiple solutions if the surplus function has S(f)
multiple peaks. For simplicity, we assume that the function is single peaked
48
to ensure a unique solution (although ourmain resultthattheethicalconstraint
can allow economic rents holds without this assumption).
Rewriting equation (6) yields an expression for the ratio of the attorney’s
and client’s marginal payoffs at the surplus-maximizing fee,
ˆˆ f (dA/df)f
p ,( 7 ) ˆ ˆ 1  fA
where . This ratio equals the (local) elasticity of the award
 ∗ dA/df p A(dE /df)
with respect to the contingent fee.
49 When the award payoff is less elastic,
a lower value of the contingent fee maximizes . (1  f)A
Under the minimum-ﬁxed-fee restriction, the client prefers the surplus-
maximizing fee to any other contingent fee, as long as the attorney accepts ˆ f
the case. It is easy to show that, at any given value of K, attorney proﬁts
are an increasing function of the contingent fee. Hence, under the ethical
restriction, the attorney prefers the surplus-maximizing fee to any lower
contingent fee. Therefore, a contingent fee lower than cannot be an equi- ˆ f
librium outcome since both parties prefer a higher fee. On the other hand,
a contingent fee less than cannot be an equilibrium since attorneys would fZ
earn negative proﬁts. This analysis directly implies the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 2. If the lawsuit is ﬁled, the equilibrium contingent fee is
the greater of the zero-proﬁt fee and the surplus-maximizing fee. Theattorney
earns strictly positive proﬁts only if the surplus-maximizing fee is greater
than the zero-proﬁt fee.
We now derive necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for attorneys to earn
positive proﬁts, which occurs when the surplus-maximizing fee is greater
than the zero-proﬁt fee and the client ﬁles suit. Deﬁne and ˆ ˆ ˆ E p E(f) A p
. When K equals , equation (5) implies that . Since ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ A(E) E  M  fA f (K) p f Z
the zero-proﬁt contingent fee decreases as K increases, it follows that
if and only if . On the other hand, the client ﬁles ˆˆ ˆ ˆ f (K) ! fK 1 E  M  fA Z
suit only if , since the client’s surplus would otherwise be neg- ˆ ˆ K ≤ (1  f)A
47 At , the client receives K. At , the client receives K since and
∗ f p 1 f p 0 E (0) p 0
. However, by choosing some , the attorney will put forth a positive amount A(0) p 0 f  (0, 1)
of effort and the client will receive a strictly positive share of the recovery less K. Therefore,
. ˆ f  (0, 1)
48 Given that , the surplus function has a single peak if it is quasi-concave. S(0) p S(1) p 0
49 By making substitutions from equations (2) and (3), it is possible to derive other alge-
braically equivalent expressions for , as in Hay, supra note 5, at 511. None of the expressions ˆ f
are in closed form; they all relate the contingent fee to endogenous quantities that depend on
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ative. Algebra conﬁrms that a range for K that satisﬁes both inequalities
exists if and only if is positive, which is the case we focus ˆ ˆˆ V p A  E  M
on below.
50
The condition that must be positive has an intuitive interpretation. At ˆ V
any contingent fee, the combined value of the lawsuit equals the sum of
attorney proﬁt and client surplus. If the combined value is not positive at
the surplus-maximizing fee, then the attorney cannot earn positive proﬁts
without the client receiving negative surplus. Of course, negative surplus is
inconsistent with client participation. Hence, it is possible for the attorney
to earn positive proﬁts while still leaving nonnegative surplus for the client
only if the combined value is positive at the surplus-maximizing fee.
On the other hand, the requirement that is positive is not sufﬁcient to ˆ V
guarantee that the attorney earns positive proﬁts, as the minimum ﬁxed fee
must also be in the appropriate range. Recall that the ﬁxed fee affects neither
attorney effort nor the combined value but only the division between attorney
proﬁts and client surplus. It follows that as long as is positive, a range of ˆ V
ﬁxed fees exist that allocates the total value in a manner such that both proﬁts
and client surplus are positive. The relevant range for the minimum ﬁxed
fee is given by the two inequalities above that guarantee positive proﬁts and
nonnegative surplus.
In this range, the minimum ﬁxed fee is sufﬁciently high that the associated
zero-proﬁt contingent fee is lower than the surplus-maximizing fee. As stated
in Proposition 2, competition does not drive the equilibrium contingent fee
below the surplus-maximizing fee since a lower contingent fee would de-
crease client surplus. Also, in this range, the ﬁxed fee is not so high that
client surplus is nonnegative. So the client ﬁles the lawsuit and the attorney
earns positive proﬁts. To summarize:
Proposition 3. If the combined value of the lawsuit is positive at the
surplus-maximizing fee, then for any minimum ﬁxed fee greater than ˆ E 
and less than or equal to , ˆˆ ˆˆ M  fA (1  f)A
i) the lawsuit is ﬁled,
ii) the equilibrium contingent fee is the surplus-maximizing fee,
iii) client surplus is nonnegative,
iv) attorney proﬁts are strictly positive, and
v) the combined value of the lawsuit is independent of the minimum ﬁxed
fee.
Note that attorney proﬁts, which are given by , decrease ˆˆ ˆ p p fA  K  E  M
as the minimum ﬁxed fee is decreased within the stated interval. Attorneys
are harmed by even a marginal relaxation of the restriction, because a $1
decrease in K implies a $1 shift of surplus from the attorney to the client.
50 When is negative, attorneys earn zero proﬁts on all lawsuits that go to court, although ˆ V
some lawsuits may be dropped if K is positive and sufﬁciently large.562 the journal of law and economics
Client surplus, which is given by , increases as the ﬁxed fee ˆ ˆ (1  f)A  K
restriction is relaxed.
On the other hand, if the minimum ﬁxed fee K is below the range set forth
in Proposition 3, the associated zero-proﬁt fee is greater than the surplus-
maximizing fee. Competition then forces the contingent fee down to the zero-
proﬁt level. With no proﬁts, the client surplus equals the value of the lawsuit,
which is strictly positive. For minimum ﬁxed fees in this lower range, small
decreases in K do not affect attorney proﬁts since the equilibrium contingent
fee rises to ensure attorney participation. However, client surplus is larger at
lower ﬁxed fees, because the higher associated contingent fee induces the
attorney to choose a higher effort level. With more effort, the value of the
lawsuit increases, and this increase in value accrues to the client.
51 In this
range, therefore, relaxing the minimum ﬁxed fee is a weak Pareto improve-
ment, strictly increasing the client surplus while keeping attorney proﬁts
constant at zero. The next proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 4. If the combined value of the lawsuit is positive at the
surplus-maximizing contingent fee, then for any minimum ﬁxed fee less than
or equal to but greater than ,
0 ˆˆ ˆ E  M  fA V
i) the lawsuit is ﬁled,
ii) the equilibrium contingent fee is the zero-proﬁt contingent fee,
iii) client surplus equals the combined value of the lawsuit, and
iv) the combined value of the lawsuit is a decreasing function of the
minimum ﬁxed fee.
We now show that the minimum ﬁxed fee speciﬁed by the Model Rules
(K equal to zero) implies positive attorney proﬁts when the ﬁxed costs of
litigation are sufﬁciently small. To see this, suppose that ﬁxed costs are zero.
Then the assumption that the marginal product of attorney effort is initially
very large implies that the attorney can earn strictly positive proﬁts by choos-
ing a positive (though possibly very small) level of effort. Since ﬁxed costs
do not affect the attorney’s effort (equation (2)), introducing ﬁxed costs of
M simply reduces proﬁts by M dollars. So proﬁts remain positive if M is
sufﬁciently small.
More formally, the positive-proﬁts interval exists ( ) if , ˆ ˆˆ V 1 0 M ! A  E
51 Formally, let and denote the client’s surplus and the combined value of the S (K) V (K) ZZ
lawsuit when the ﬁxed fee is equal to K and the contingent fee equals the corresponding zero-
proﬁt level, . By construction, we have , so f (K) S (K) p V (K) p (1f (K))A(E(f (K))K ZZ Z Z Z
straightforward differentiation yields
dV(K) dS (K)1 f ZZ pp ! 0. 3    dK dK f AA Zlegal fee restrictions 563
and algebra conﬁrms that lies within the interval when .
52 ˆˆ ˆ K p 0 M ! fA  E
The latter inequality clearly implies the former. It follows that if the ﬁxed
costs are not too large, they satisfy the latter inequality, and a zero ﬁxed fee
lies in the positive-proﬁts interval described by Proposition 3.
Proposition 5. If ﬁxed costs are sufﬁciently small, then a minimum
ﬁxed fee equal to zero yields positive proﬁts.
The top panel of Figure 1 graphs the equilibrium contingent fee as a
function of the minimum ﬁxed fee (holding constant the award function and
the ﬁxed costs). During the zero-proﬁt interval, the contingent fee declines
from unity, the unconstrained optimum, to the surplus-maximizing fee, . ˆ f
The exact value of the contingent fee in the zero-proﬁt region is implicitly
deﬁned by equation (5). The contingent fee then remains equal to throughout ˆ f
the positive-proﬁts interval.
The bottom panel shows the behavior of client surplus and attorney proﬁts
as the minimum ﬁxed fee is increased. The client’s surplus declines from
to during the zero-proﬁt interval (as does the combined value, which
0 ˆ VV
equals client surplus in the zero-proﬁt interval). Attorneys continue to earn
zero proﬁt, as competition drives down the contingent fee (below its uncon-
strained value of unity) to the zero-proﬁt value associated with the minimum
ﬁxed fee. The reduction in the contingent fee lowers attorney effort, the
resulting award, and the client surplus.
The combined value remains constant at throughout the positive-proﬁts ˆ V
interval. Throughout the positive-proﬁts interval, increases in the minimum
ﬁxed fee do nothing more than shift surplus from the client to the attorney.
Thus, attorneys are harmed by even a marginal relaxation of the restriction,
because $1 decrease in K shifts $1 from the attorney to the client. At the
other extreme, if K is positive and sufﬁciently great, the lawsuit is abandoned,
because no contingent fee makes the lawsuit attractive to the client.
This analysis demonstrates that the zero-ﬁxed-fee restriction can generate
positive attorney proﬁts. The availability of these proﬁts gives each attorney
an incentive to take additional lawsuits and creates incentives for individuals
to enter the legal profession. Can the positive proﬁts persist in the face of
these incentives, and, if not, do lawyers have any motivation to impose the
restriction? We now address these issues in a more dynamic model and
demonstrate that attorneys continue to have an incentive to maintain the
ethical restriction.
V. Sunk Entry Costs and Nonprice Competition
In this section, we allow entry into the market for legal services under
the assumption that entry requiresa sunkinvestment(reﬂectingthesubstantial
52 It is easy to see that . Since is an increasing concave function and ˆˆ ˆ fAE 1 0 A(E)
, it follows that , where the last equality makes use of equation
  A(0) p 0 A(E) 1 EA(E) p E/f
(2).564 the journal of law and economics
Figure 1.—Legal fee restrictions, moral hazard, and attorney rents
costs of legal education). With unrestricted entry, economic rents earned by
existing attorneys from their lawsuits should, in equilibrium, equal a normal
return on their sunk entry investment. After accounting for those investment
costs, attorneys earn no pure proﬁts. Nevertheless, we show that attorneys
who have already entered have an incentive to maintain the fee restrictions
because they cannot recover their entry costs without them.
Consider a simple variant of the above model. Let L denote the number
of lawyers and T denote the sunk cost of entry. Attorneys are identical, andlegal fee restrictions 565
each receives a random allocation of the total N lawsuits available to the
profession. We use to denote the average proﬁt earned on a lawsuit. ¯ p(K)
Proposition 3 implies that is an increasing function of K. With unres- ¯ p(K)
tricted entry, attorneys enter and the number of lawsuits per attorney ( ) N/L
falls until the rents earned on lawsuits equals the entry costs, driving ex ante
proﬁts to zero:
N
¯ P p p(K)  T p 0. (8) () L
Although attorneys are not earning economic proﬁts once one accounts for
entry costs, they have an economic interest to maintain the constraints. If
the fee restrictions are unexpectedly removed immediately after entry occurs,
falls to zero, and incumbent attorneys incur ex post losses equal to T. ¯ p(K)
Even a marginal relaxation of the constraint reduces and induces ex ¯ p(K)
post losses. Of course, the relaxation of the restrictions does not harm sub-
sequent cohorts of entrants, because they are aware of the change when they
make their entry decisions.
Starting from a point at which fees are unrestricted, it still may not be
clear that attorneys ever have an incentive to introduce the restrictions. If
entry occurs with a lag, however, such an incentive exists because the cohort
that imposes the restrictions earns temporary pure proﬁts and enjoys higher
lifetime incomes. The discussion in Section IIB also suggests an alternative
explanation. The champerty prohibition appears to have been initially im-
posed for unrelated reasons during an era in which litigants did not hire
professional attorneys. The above analysis may explain why these historical
remnants have been maintained.
Given attorneys’ inability to attract clients by charging lower fees, they
may attempt to attract them through advertising or other forms of nonprice
competition. Of course, there is little reason to expend signiﬁcant resources
on attracting clients if lawsuits do not yield positive proﬁts. Therefore, our
model allows us to interpret previous general bans on attorney advertising
as attempts to limit nonprice competition.
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to model the precise mechanismthrough
which nonprice competition may attract clients. We can, however, sketch its
implications for our results using a variant of the present model. Rather than
model the nonprice competition directly, we simply hypothesize that a re-
lationship existsbetweenanattorney’sequilibriumexpenditureonadvertising
(or other forms of nonprice competition) and the rents earned on a typical
lawsuit, . Speciﬁcally, we let be an attorney’s equilibrium ex- ¯ ¯ p(K) c(p(K))
penditure, where we assume that attorneys spend more money on advertising
53 The advertising prohibitions were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as a violation
of freedom of speech. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (invalidating the
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if lawsuits are, on average, more proﬁtable. As long as potential entrants
anticipate the nonprice competition, unrestricted entry then implies
N
¯ ¯ P p p(K)  c(p(K))  T p 0. (9) () L
That is, attorneys enter the industry until the rents earned on lawsuits equal
the sum of the entry costs and expenditures on nonprice competition, which
drives ex ante proﬁts to zero.
Now, once again, assume that the ethical restrictions are either eliminated
or signiﬁcantly relaxed after entry occurs. If K becomes sufﬁciently negative,
virtually all lawsuits yield zero economic rents. (We know from Proposition
4 that it is not necessary for the ethical restriction to be eliminated in order
for per-lawsuit proﬁts to become zero.)Presumably,withzeroeconomicrents,
any signiﬁcant nonprice competition would cease ( ), which implies c(0) p 0
that attorneys earn ex post losses ( ). P { T ! 0
However, a negative minimum ﬁxed fee need not drive rents on every
lawsuit to zero in order for attorneys to be harmed. On the contrary, even
if the rents on a typical lawsuit remain positive and nonprice competition
ceases completely, attorneys may not be able to fully recover their sunk costs.
We know that continues to fall as K becomes more negative. So ex ¯ p(K)
post proﬁts necessarily become negative despite the fact that expenditures
on nonprice competition decrease and partially offset the loss in rents. For
the sake of argument, suppose that nonprice competition essentially disap-
pears as gets small. Then, for sufﬁciently small , we have ¯¯ p(K) p(K)
N
¯ P p p(K)  T ! 0. (10) () L
Therefore, with or without nonprice competition, attorneys have good reason
to maintain the minimum-ﬁxed-fee restriction when the costs of entry cannot
be recovered.
VI. Extensions
Throughout we have made several simplifying assumptions in order to
maintain tractability. In this section, we explore the robustness of our results
with respect to each of them.
A. Client Moral Hazard and Asymmetric Information
We have assumed the existence of a moral hazard problem from unob-
servable attorney effort, but not from unobservable client effort. As several
authors have noted, the success of the lawsuit may require the active par-
ticipation of both the client and the attorney, which creates a two-sided morallegal fee restrictions 567
hazard problem.
54 To be sure, when the award depends on the client’s unob-
servable effort, the most efﬁcient contingent fee is less than 100 percent in
order to provide incentive for the client to put forth effort.
However, so long as client effort is of limited importance, the equilibrium
contingent fee is likely to remain high, and the associated zero-proﬁt ﬁxed
fee in the unconstrained equilibrium is still likely to be negative, although
less negative than the value . On the other hand, if client moral hazard
0 V
is sufﬁciently important relative to attorney moral hazard, it is theoretically
possible that the unconstrained equilibrium entails a positive ﬁxed fee. In
this latter case, an ethical restriction requiring is not binding and has F ≥ 0
no real effects.
Positive ﬁxed fees are, however, rarely observed for personal injury law-
suits. The prevalence of zero ﬁxed fees in the presence of a nonnegativity
restriction compels the conclusion that the restriction is indeed binding in
reality. Of course, as our analysis has shown, the mere fact that the constraint
binds does not imply that rents are positive (see Proposition 4). Nevertheless,
the logic underlying Proposition 5 continues to hold in the presence of client
moral hazard, as long as the minimum-ﬁxed-fee constraint is binding at zero.
More precisely, at any positive contingent fee, the attorney chooses an effort
level such that ,
55 which implies positive proﬁts for lawsuits fA(E)  E 1 0
with sufﬁciently small ﬁxed costs. Therefore, our main result that the fee
restrictions can allow economic rents for attorneys continues to hold in such
environments.
We have also ignored client adverse selection, which has implications
similar to those of client moral hazard. Daniel Rubinfeld and SuzanneScotch-
mer establish that if the client has more information than the attorney about
the quality of the lawsuit, the equilibrium contingent fee may be less than
100 percent.
56 If clients were allowed to sell lawsuits and attorneys unable
to determine the true value of the suit, then clients would have an incentive
to sell “bad” lawsuits to attorneys. For those lawsuits with true values that
are difﬁcult for the attorney to ascertain but are easily determined by the
client, we would expect an unrestricted competitive market to require ﬁxed
fees that are strictly positive to screen the “bad” lawsuits. Nevertheless, as
discussed above, we rarely observe positive ﬁxed fees for personal injury
lawsuits, which suggests that adverse selection is not a signiﬁcant problem
in practice.
In sum, the attorney’s unobservable effort is likely to be far more important
to the lawsuit’s outcome than the client’s unobservable effort. In many civil
54 See Danzon, supra note 9, at 223; Shukaitis, supra note 1, at 340; and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
& Suzanne Scotchmer, Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis, 24 RAND J.
Econ. 343, 349 n.14 (1993).
55 See note 52 supra.
56 Rubinfeld & Scotchmer, supra note 54, at 348–50.568 the journal of law and economics
suits, much of the client’s participation can be ensured early in the litigation
with written testimony, evidence of property damages, and medical reports.
Providing this information also tends to dispel the client’s informational
advantage. It is not surprising, then, that client moral hazard and adverse
selection appear to be of minor practical importance.
B. Risk Aversion
In this analysis, we have assumed that both clients and attorneys are risk
neutral. As several authors note, it is plausible to assume that attorneys are
risk neutral with respect to the outcome of each lawsuit, because they usually
handle many (relatively) independent lawsuits.
57
Allowing risk-averse clients does not alter our basic results. The uncon-
strained equilibrium still involves a 100 percent contingent fee.
58 “Selling”
the lawsuit to the attorney not only alleviates the moral hazard problem but
also distributes the risk efﬁciently—to the risk-neutral attorney. Competition
continues to drive expected attorney proﬁts to zero.
Under the ethical constraint, holding the ﬁxed fee constant, the qualitative
result of Proposition 2 remains valid. The client’s expected utility will be
maximized at some interior value of the contingent fee, since at unity the
attorney receives all of the proceeds, while at zero the attorney puts forth
no effort and the client gets no recovery. A positive-proﬁts equilibrium can
still be sustained at this utility-maximizing fee.
C. Nonlinear Contracts
We have assumed throughout that the contract must be linear in the award.
For the unconstrained case, this assumption was not restrictive, since a con-
tingent fee of unity achieved the efﬁcient outcome. However, the linearity
assumption is restrictive in the constrained case, because it is likely that more
general contracts, particularly those involving complex forms of nonlinearity,
could improve client welfare.
On the whole, however, the linearity assumption is not contradicted by
observation—most attorneys in civil suits are compensated by simple con-
tingent fees. Furthermore, the nonlinearity that is observed tends to be of
limited simple forms.
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Despite the general complexity involved with nonlinear contracts, there is
a simple situation in which restricting attention to linear fees entails no loss
of generality. It arises when attorney effort affects only the probability of
57 See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 7, at 1150–51; Clermont & Currivan, supra note
20, at 565 n.86; Shavell, supra note 46, at 66; and Rubinfeld & Scotchmer, supra note 54, at
346.
58 See Shavell, supra note 46, at 56; and Halpern & Turnbull, supra note 44, at 16.
59 See Hay, supra note 5, at 525; and Hay, supra note 6, at 272.legal fee restrictions 569
winning, not the expected value of the actual damage award, conditional on
winning. This occurs when the damage award is determined by the “facts”
of the lawsuit, such as medical bills or lost wages. The award function then
has the form , where is the probability of winning as a ˜ A(E) p P(E)a P(E)
function of effort and is the expected value of the actual award, conditional ˜ a
on winning. In this case, any contract that is nonlinear in the actual award
and that does not violate the ethical constraint is equivalent to a linear
contract. In short, the linearity assumption may not be very restrictive if
attorney effort primarily affects the probability of a civil suit’s success, with
little impact on the size of the damage award.
D. Defense Attorneys
We have ignored the role of defense attorneys in this analysis. Since bar
associations include defense attorneys as well as plaintiff’s attorneys, the
impact of fee restrictions on their well-being is also relevant in a political
economy explanation. While it is easy to see that fee restrictions beneﬁt
defendants by lowering awards, a full modeling of the effect on defense
attorneys requires the resolution of several issues that we leave to further
research. For example, the fact that defense attorneys usually are paid an
hourly fee (rather than a contingent fee) suggests that defendants can better
monitor attorneys. This is plausible since many defendants, such as insurance
companies, either have their own in-house legal departments or deal with
the same attorneys on a repeated basis. Given that the effort of plaintiffs’
attorneys may induce either more or less effort from defense attorneys, the
reduction in the effort of the former because of the ethical restriction has
ambiguous implications for the effort of the latter.
However, the most important point is that attorneys can, to a large extent,
move between the two groups. Indeed, some attorneys divide their time
between work for plaintiffs and for defendants. A simple no-arbitrage ar-
gument suggests that the payoffs to both types of work are likely to rise or
fall together as the ethical restrictions are changed. A relaxation of the ethical
restriction that reduces the proﬁts of plaintiffs’ lawyers is likely to induce
them to enter defense work, lowering the incomes of attorneys already prac-
ticing in that area. As a historical matter, defense attorneys, along with de-
fendants, played a leading role in supporting a continued ban on champerty
in the late nineteenth century.
60
VII. Concluding Remarks
We have provided a positive economic explanation for the seemingly in-
efﬁcient ethical rules that prevent an attorney from “purchasing” a client’s
legal claim to recover damages in a civil suit. If attorney effort is unob-
60 See Karsten, supra note 12, at 254.570 the journal of law and economics
servable, these constraints create positive rents for attorneys whenever suc-
cessful litigation does not involve large ﬁxed costs. Intuitively, competition
along the contingent-fee dimension does not force contingent fees down to
a level that yields zero rents because such fees do not induce sufﬁcient effort
from attorneys. However, absent such ethical restrictions, competition re-
moves the rents, and client welfare is improved.
Our analysis has also considered the implications of unrestricted entry
when those entering the legal profession must make a nonrecoverable in-
vestment. While entry does not alter the equilibrium contingent fee, it does
decrease the number of lawsuits per attorney. Entry continues until the total
rent earned by a typical attorney just offsets the costs of entry, yielding zero
ex post economic proﬁts. However, elimination of the restrictions after entry
has occurred removes the rents and causes ex post losses.
In sum, our analysis suggests that the prohibition of negative ﬁxed fees
can be understood as a means of maintaining rents for members of the legal
profession. On a formal level, the ethical constraints are simple minimum
ﬁxed fees (equal to zero), yet they seem to have escaped antitrust challenges.
While a positive minimum ﬁxed fee would generally yield larger rents, it
would be vulnerable to antitrust objections, in view of the Supreme Court’s
Goldfarb decision (discussed in Section II).
APPENDIX
Ethical Restrictions in the States and Washington, D.C.
Category 1. (under certain circumstances). Attorneys may make certain K ! 0
payments to clients (or certain loans without repayment by losing clients) (two ju-
risdictions: District of Columbia and Texas).
61
Category 2. . K p 0
A. Litigation expenses can be loaned without repayment by losing clients; other
loans can be provided (under certain restrictions) with repayment by losing clients
62
(ﬁve jurisdictions: Alabama, California, Minnesota, Montana, and North Dakota).
63
B. Litigation expenses can be loaned without repayment by losing clients (31
jurisdictions: Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Penn-
61 The two jurisdictions’ rules identify slightly different types of ﬁnancial assistance that can
be provided. See text around notes 23–24 supra (describing these rules).
62 If attorneys do not actually collect loan repayments from losing clients, category 2A is
economically equivalent to category 1.
63 The California rule allows loans for any purpose, while the other four states’ rules permit
loans only for certain purposes. See text around notes 25–26 supra (describing types of loans
permitted by rules). Also see text around notes 37–38 supra (describing how rules preclude
the making of loans prior to the employment of the attorney).legal fee restrictions 571
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
64 Utah, Vermont, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
Category 3. for some clients, for others. Litigation expenses can K p 0 K 1 0
be loaned without repayment by losing clients who are indigent or unable to pay,
but other losing clients must repay
65 (seven jursdictions: Arizona, Colorado, Mich-
igan, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, and Virginia).
Category 4. . Litigation expenses can be loaned, but losing clients must K 1 0
repay
66 (six jurisdictions: Iowa, Maine,
67 Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, and
Washington).
Each jurisdiction’s classiﬁcation is based on the authors’ examination of its rules
(generally 1999 or 2000 versions). Copies of the rules are available from the authors
on request. Classiﬁcations do not reﬂect differences in enforcement or judicial
interpretation.
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